La noción aristotélica de definición y la designación rígida de Saul Kripke: una semejanza

Abstract

The notion of rigid designation has been consistently criticized in current studies about metaphysics. In this context, many authors argue that the concept, rigid designator, is only a linguistic and modal notion and that Saul Kripke does not have an effective relationship with Aristotelian philosophy. Many authors deny that the rigid designation notion belongs to essentialism. Other authors accept the term has metaphysical implications, but they ask for a more explicit theory about these notions. The relationship between Aristotle and Kripke is a polemic one, so, in this paper, I present a comparison between two notions: Kripke’s rigid designation and Aristotel’s definition. Both notions have a vital relationship with metaphysical considerations, but they are also linguistic notions. This paper explores the differences and similarities between both concepts to answer the question about their relationship. At the same time, this paper defends the experience of reality as the ground for Aristotelian and Kripkean linguistic theories and recognizes the existence of essences in the life world. This relationship with the world is a commonplace implicit in both theories. In this context, this paper argues in favor of the metaphysical implications of Saul Kipke’s designation theory and finds a common thread between his work and Aristotle’s.